THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008

Quote for the day:

1. Cash is King – anonymous.

The biggest news hogging the headlines for the past 10 months or so is the total unraveling of the global financial system that till now has wiped out trillions of dollars (one new stories gave a figure of $12 trillion) and requires trillions more in bailout money. What started out as an American sub – prime mortgage crisis has now officially become a global financial crisis engulfing every nation on earth. And why has this happened? It is because of 3 things: (1) The creation of the derivatives market, (2) over – leverage of the typical working middle class, and (3) the globalization of finance. Derivatives are securities on a security (a security is a financial instrument indicating ownership or claim on a property or asset, be it an equity like common stock or debt such as bonds that has financial value and is tradable). To illustrate, imagine a 5 year tenor bond that pays 5% per annum quarterly that is bought by a financial entity. The financial entity in turn issues 5 – one year tenor bonds based on the 5 year tenor bond (obviously the two should have the same maturity). The interest to be paid for the 5 – one year bonds is derived from the interest income coming from the original 5 year bond. The financial entity makes money by pocketing the difference between the interest payout to the one year bonds and the income derived from the 5 year bond. Using the illustration, supposed that the interest rate of those one year bonds is set at 4% per annum, then by calculation, the financial entity makes a profit of 1% every year from the difference between the interest payout and income. The original 5 year bond is the security, while the 5 – one year bonds created from the original bond is the derivative. Based on the illustration, one might say that derivatives are not that complicated and it is a simple thing but in reality, the truth is much farther. Derivatives are way, way more complex. There are many derivatives in the market such as options, warrants, bond derivatives, Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO), futures, etc. Now, if betting in a security is a tough call because nobody can really predict the future and the behavior of a security whether it would go up value or collapse the next day is highly volatile, imagine then betting on a derivative that hinges on these volatile and unpredictable securities. It’s a lot tougher. If buying on security is like playing a dinner table poker, playing derivatives is like gambling in a high stake casino. Now, the present financial crisis started out as a sub – prime mortgage crisis. Sub – prime mortgages by it’s term refers to real estate mortgages (loans for purchase of real estate and using the real estate in question as collateral) made to people with poor creditworthiness and/or to people with good credit standing but due to certain circumstances, the loans to be made do not conform to certain standard requirements and hence rendering these people with good credit standing ineligible to apply for the loan. In short, sub – prime mortgages are pretty risky loans with high default risk that normally, a prudent investor would shriek at putting their money into. However, due to their high risk nature, the commensurate pay – off is also high, i.e., the interest charged on this type of loans are quite high, very much higher than the prevailing interest rate. As such, it becomes “enticing” to some investors looking for means to “maximize” the return on their investments but their numbers are however, few. To broaden the appeal of the sub – mortgages to the greater number of investors looking for high return and relatively “acceptable” risks, investment banks began to package them as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), a type of bonds whose cash payments to the bond holders came from the payments made on mortgages by the mortgagor (the borrower). In this set – up, the investment bankers are the ones who technically assume the risk of credit default by the mortgagor. Usually, investment bankers in order to assure bond investors of the steady stream of cash flows payout in spite of the erratic cash flow payment behavior of these high risk loans, would pool together numerous mortgages and creates a “basket” from these mortgages with more or less a predictable cash flows. The investment banker makes money from the whole scheme of things through charging commission on the sale of the bonds and the fees from obtaining the loan, management fees and etc. Investment banks don’t make money from the loans. This is entirely different from the traditional commercial mortgage loans obtained from a commercial bank. In the commercial bank mortgage loans, the banks obtained their loanable funds from depositors and in return pay, the depositors a fixed interest for the deposits which are usually low. The commercial bank would then in turn lend out these amassed funds to borrowers in return for interest payment. A commercial bank makes money from the spread between the interest paid to the depositors and the interest earned from the loans. In addition to that, the commercial banks assume the risk of credit default of borrowers. In this traditional set – up, due to the fact that the profit of commercial banks came from the interest spread between loans and deposits, return of investments on the part of the depositors are hideously low. Furthermore, banks are fiduciary financial institutions i.e., they are institution of trusts and as such are highly regulated by the government. Henceforth, commercial banks cannot just simply give out loans freely to anyone and this in turn forced them to apply stringent credit evaluation guidelines. As a result, poor credit quality borrowers were often unable to obtain loans from a commercial bank and sub – prime mortgages wouldn’t have existed at all. In contrast, the CDO deal would technically create a win – win solution for all the parties involved. The investor (the equivalent to the depositor of a commercial bank) would earn higher rate of return from his funds, the investment bank makes money through commissions and fees, and because the whole set – up is not regulated like that of commercial banks, poor credit quality borrowers can actually get a loan. It is precisely because of this supposed “win – win” scenario that makes CDOs the more preferred form of mortgage lending than the traditional set – up except for one caveat, the risk assumed by the banks. For investment banks, the credit default risk is very high, higher than the risks assumed by commercial banks because of the credit quality of the borrowers. To circumvent this problem, investment banks created another derivative product called credit derivatives and the types usually employed in this deals are the credit default swaps (CDS). This is where AIG comes in. Credit default swaps are very much like insurances. The investment banks basically buys a cover against credit defaults from the sub – prime borrowers and pays a certain sum for that cover with the basket of mortgage loans as reference not as collateral. In the event of a credit event be it a default on payment or a declaration of bankruptcy or pre – payment of loans, etc, the seller of the credit default swaps (in this case, AIG) pays the buyer of the swaps (the investment bankers) an amount equivalent to the difference between the actual market value of the defaulted security and the agreed value. So if the security is initially valued at let say, $1 million and after the credit event, the market value of the security is say $800k, then, the seller of CDS would pay the buyer the difference, which in this case is $200k. CDS may seem simple enough but it is actually not. CDS differs from a regular insurance in one aspect, namely, the collateral or the property or asset to be insured. In an insurance, there is a property or an asset to be insured and serve as collateral (in the case of insurance, the collateral is usually irretrievable in the event that triggers a payout). In CDS, the property or asset in question which in this case refers to the basket of mortgage loans serve only as reference for the calculation of the premium payments and eventual payout. There is no collateral at all. In short, investment banks or any financial entity doesn’t have to hold the reference securities in question but they still could buy for the cover and receive payout in case of credit defaults. In addition to that, there is no regulation to supervise the creation and sale of CDS. So what the whole set – up suggest is that CDS like any other derivatives are tradable instruments for profit gain and not simply just for cover of risks. So in the event that an entity felt that likelihood of default increases due to some macroeconomic changes and therefore increase the likelihood of a payout from the seller of the CDS, the holder of the CDS could sell it to a third party for a certain amount of profit. Or, the seller of the CDS could “sell” the swap to a third party in return for cash up front while the third party receives the premium payment from the buyer of CDS granting the likelihood of default is minimal at that juncture. Now, with the understanding of the underlying financial basis of the sub – prime mortgage loans, one would get a feeling that the entire complex and supposedly, “win – win” dealings hang by a very thin hairline, which is the paying capacity of the mortgagor or the borrower. If the borrowers pay their mortgages diligently and timely, the wheel of this dizzying meshwork of a clock would keep on going. On the other hand, if a few borrowers were unable to pay and defaulted on their mortgages, the “clock” would suffer a jolt but it will still tick but if there is a massive bankruptcy of the borrowers, the clocks utterly breakdown and the result is catastrophic and chaotic as we’re in right now. This led us to the second of cause of the global meltdown, which is the over leverage positions of the middle class Americans. Since the 1990s, with the launch of the dotcom boom, the ensuing prosperity has greatly increased the “paper wealth” of the average American thus laying the foundation for increase in spending. Couple this with a healthy economic growth for almost 2 decades, American spending increases dramatically to the extent that during the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, American consumers became “the consumer of the world”. Two recessions, the Mexican Peso Crisis, the Russian financial crisis, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the dotcom bubble burst, and the 2001 terrorist attacks had temporarily tempered the American economy but failed to completely dampen it. This is due in large part to the aggressive rate – cutting authored by the Federal Reserve under the guidance of Alan Greenspan. As a result, American spending continued to roar on. This time, it is abetted by cheap credit. It became common at that time for a typical American to possess multiple credit cards with credit transfer features. It was also at this time when American began to translate their paper wealth into hard assets via investments in real estate and automobiles. So what all this translate to is that the claims on the future cash flows, i.e., the money that had yet to earn of the average American grew significantly such that not much could be saved from what remains of those future earnings. Given this scenario, in prosperous times where opportunities for economic gains abound, future incomes are assured and were enough to cover all these claims. However, in bad economic situation, future cash flows becomes unstable and claims has caused an added burden to consumer struggling to make ends meet. This is what happened two years ago when inflation sky rocketed mainly due to a surge in oil prices and the spiraling increase in the cost of food. Added this to the aggressive rate increases to curtail inflation by the Federal Reserves, the claims on future earnings grew and ate whatever little surplus those future earnings had if not totally outstripped it. As an immediate consequence, Americans first reacted by withholding payments for big ticket items like mortgages or selling their fixed asset holdings like real estate. However, in a struggling economy wherein a few can afford to buy, the influx of so many real estate for sale resulted in precipitous dropped of real estate prices. This is in turn exacerbated the worsening mortgage crisis as paying mortgagor suddenly find themselves saddled with expensive debts with soaring interest rate backed by real estate whose value is declining rapidly. And so, it came to a point that defaulting on expensive mortgages packs more financial logic than holding onto it. This in turn creates a snowballing effect that produced the sub – prime mortgage crisis late last year. On the financial side of the sub – prime mortgage crisis, the patchwork of derivative deals has broken down completely as the cash flows from mortgage payments dried up forcing investment bankers to pay up the bondholders (the buyers of CDOs) from their own pockets and since investment banks normally don’t take in deposits, they’re hard pressed for cash. This in turn force some bondholders to call in the CDOs whenever possible which further aggravate the already perilous state of investment banks. Now, the CDS should in theory cover for the mounting losses from sub – prime mortgages but since the value of tradable CDS are way, way bigger than the actual mortgage default and the fact that the seller of CDS didn’t set aside a contingency fund in the event of default and that the default is no longer a distinct possibility but a reality, the fund required for payout of the cover is simply too much for a insurer of credit default and this is what led AIG to sought for government bailout. Now, with CDS being somewhat “useless”, investment banks are left alone to fend for themselves. With no revenue income (due to defaulting mortgages and restricted payouts from CDS), pricy debts (due to high interest rate CDO’s), and virtually no funds on its own (since investment banks don’t take in deposits like a regular commercial banks), investment banks are left with no choice but to find ways to raise funds and payout the bondholders. They do this by either selling their shares in return for cash infusion or borrowing heavily to finance short term debts. But as we all know, one cannot survive by raising debts at least, not that long. Because of the deteriorating financial conditions, financial institutions with excess funds became apprehensive about lending out precious cash to firms with doubtful survivality. And this triggers among other things, the fall of investment banks led by Bear Sterns and (hopefully) ended with Lehman Brothers, thus, precipitating, the Wall Street Financial Meltdown. Even so, the Wall Street Meltdown was actually an American crisis and limited to the USA only. It morphed into something greater because of a third factor and that is the globalization of finance. Since the end of the cold war in the beginning of the 1990’s, nations around the world began to realize the “superiority” of the capitalist system and quickly adopted it by opening up their markets to foreign trade and investment through the removal of tariffs and the removal of restriction on the flow of capital in and out of the country. The result is the alignment and integration of the national financial systems to the world financial markets dominated by Western Europe and Japan and led by the United States and this in the process gave birth to the global financial system that we see today. Financial markets of every nation around the world became more closely linked and highly dependent on each other. It is therefore no surprise to see American companies having financial interest across the globe and that the rest of the world has financial interests in America. One of the greatest American exports aside from Capitalism, Democracy, automobiles, computers, the internet, and McDonald’s is the derivative instruments (and the financial crisis if one is to be sarcastic about it). Companies around the world including their government’s central banks usually invested in American debt, a major part of which are in treasury notes but with sizeable investments in bonds issued by venerable Wall Street institutions with superb credit rating like Bear Stern and Lehman Brothers. So when Wall Street is crumbling, the rest of the world became apprehensive about buying into American debt and this in turn created a credit squeeze on these once high flying investment banks. As the value of American debts kept falling, the finances of some of these companies outside America are also gravely affected resulting into their shaky financial situation and expose their vulnerability to sudden adverse changes in the macro environment. And that adverse change was triggered with the fall of Lehman Brothers (a venerable financial institution with long history and previously good credit standing) and it’s eventually bankruptcy. Soon, companies with poor financial foundation and huge exposure to the toxic American debt followed suit and this in turn forced companies especially commercial banks to become even more apprehensive if not outright fearful about lending precious funds to other banks who maybe in intensive care. The net effect was the frozen the credit market. You see some companies for one reason or the other cannot turn their paper profits into cash easily that could fund their daily activities and they therefore turn to the short term debt market like the commercial papers market for their financing needs. However, with the credit market frozen, cash suddenly becomes scarce and companies are fraught with to panic on how to “sustain” their operations even if they are profitable and the old adage about “Cash is King” became the cardinal rule in the market. With little cash and nowhere else to borrow money from, the next logical step among companies was to sell whatever asset they could sell in order to raise cash and the most liquid of all assets available to them for the moment are their marketable securities that they’re holding, i.e., stocks (other assets like fixed assets are harder to sell and could materially affect their operational sustainability). After all, a dollar in cash is much better than a dollar in stocks whose value may become next to nothing overnight. This caused the global sell – off in stocks that we bear witness to the past few weeks. The global stock selling frenzy cause the companies to sustain loses which makes finances of these companies all the more precarious and this in turn feed more fear and panic contributing to the ceaseless downward spiral into total chaos necessitating unprecedented bailouts and intervention by governments around the world last week. And that folks, is in a nutshell (and 6 pages long), the 2008 global financial crisis, which is unraveling as we speak.

Reference:

1. Bond Markets, Analysis, and Strategies, 5th edition, international edition. Frank J. Fabozzi, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004.