I’ve bought this magazine, “Great Commanders” about a month ago. The magazine talks about the exploits, the battles and it’s significance in the course of the war, the leadership, and the command philosophy of great Generals and famous Commanders. In every issue, the magazine focuses on one particular general and in this particular issue, the person in question was no other than the great civil war general, Ulysses S. Grant, who later on went to become the president of the United States. Well, being an amateur military historian, I cannot contain my enthusiasm and immediately began to earnestly “study” about the General. After reading the articles, my impression of General Grant was that of an aggressive military leader who believes in the dictum, “offense is the best defense”. His strategies are strikingly simple and rather “straight to the point” creating an impression of boldness, daring, and decisiveness on the battlefield. In short, he is willing to take risk and doesn’t dilly – dally as most generals do at that time. This is the main reason for his success. Upon further analysis, his simple, straight – forward strategic orientation are rooted in his thinking. In particular, 2 of his quotes coming from his experience in the battlefield showed this kind thinking and had struck me the most. The first one is about the encounter with an enemy who had fled upon his approach to the former’s encampment and before any armed confrontation could happen. At that time, Colonel Grant had just assumed command of a volunteer militia unit after a hiatus of several years from active service. He recall the experience on the event in his memoir, stating:
“As we approached the brow of the hill, which it was expected we could see Harris’ camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped was plainly visible but the troops are gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting the enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his.”
The second quote on the other hand was given to a brigadier after the Union army suffered reverses on the battlefield. Here, General Grant scolded the distraught brigadier with these words:
“Oh, I’m heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is going to turn a double somersault and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.”
From these quotes, one would realize that often times we tend to “second guess” our opponent’s intentions unknowingly that our opponents are doing the same. Furthermore, in our “obsession” to “second guess” our opponent, we tend to become mere “reactors” to the situations rather than as initiator and controller of events. We tend to focus on the analysis of the situation trying to figure out a way to “mitigate” the pending yet “changeable” outcome whence in fact, the best solution to the problem was to take it by the horn. We tend to sacrifice initiative in favor of security, or more accurately, false security. However, practically speaking, it is still important that we “second guess” our opponent’s intention because if we don’t we might end up losing control of the event that we intend to gain in the first place. But this “second guessing” shouldn’t come at the price of initiative and control. By initiative, it means that we don’t let our opponent dictate what is going to happen next rather that we should be creating what will happen next. In my conclusion, there should come a point wherein we have to decide if further “accumulation” of information for analysis and evaluation is still practicable as an input in our decision making or we have to decide now even with the limited inputs so as not to give up control of event. Time is of the essence and we have to take risk. Although these quotes are made by General Grant in relation to his experience in the battlefield, it can no less be applied in situations outside the military sphere, specifically in the broader management decision making. Though the marketplace is decidedly less “bloody” than the battlefield, it however has its tense and “heart – pounding” moments. And it is here that Grant’s thoughts could be useful in gauging risk taking and bidding time. There was this term I learned from Mintzberg and that is “paralysis by analysis”, which is in essence similar to what General Grant was saying all along albeit in a more general context. Paralysis by analysis refers to the indecision of a leader in situations where the analyses are inconclusive. No conclusion, no decision, no moves, period. It can also refer to the fact that with “over” analysis, we tend to be overwhelmed by the gravity of the situation and balk at making a move. Frozen with fear leading again to no movements. What we ought to learn here is that situations may not be what we thought to be since there are a lot of constantly changing variables in play that our mind cannot conceive, which would drastically alter the outcome and one such variable is the opponent’s or competitor’s trepidations. Aside from that, indecision makes us a sitting duck to the conspiring events and to our competitor’s/opponent’s machinations thereby losing our initiatives to play the events to our advantage. However, to forgo analysis and instead purely rely on “instinct” is also unwise for according to Mintzberg, there is such a thing as “extinction by instinct”. Not everyone possesses a superior instinct and instinct is not grounded on facts but on unconscious gut – feel or for most people, emotion, which would be pretty unreliable during confusing uncertainty, i.e., one may cower when the going gets tough. The best way to make a decision is to analyze up to a certain degree, trust your instinct, take risk, siege the initiative, and improvise. That however, is easier said than done. And it is in this situation that we had to refer to Grant’s quotes.
“As we approached the brow of the hill, which it was expected we could see Harris’ camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view I halted. The place where Harris had been encamped was plainly visible but the troops are gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting the enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his.”
The second quote on the other hand was given to a brigadier after the Union army suffered reverses on the battlefield. Here, General Grant scolded the distraught brigadier with these words:
“Oh, I’m heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is going to turn a double somersault and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.”
From these quotes, one would realize that often times we tend to “second guess” our opponent’s intentions unknowingly that our opponents are doing the same. Furthermore, in our “obsession” to “second guess” our opponent, we tend to become mere “reactors” to the situations rather than as initiator and controller of events. We tend to focus on the analysis of the situation trying to figure out a way to “mitigate” the pending yet “changeable” outcome whence in fact, the best solution to the problem was to take it by the horn. We tend to sacrifice initiative in favor of security, or more accurately, false security. However, practically speaking, it is still important that we “second guess” our opponent’s intention because if we don’t we might end up losing control of the event that we intend to gain in the first place. But this “second guessing” shouldn’t come at the price of initiative and control. By initiative, it means that we don’t let our opponent dictate what is going to happen next rather that we should be creating what will happen next. In my conclusion, there should come a point wherein we have to decide if further “accumulation” of information for analysis and evaluation is still practicable as an input in our decision making or we have to decide now even with the limited inputs so as not to give up control of event. Time is of the essence and we have to take risk. Although these quotes are made by General Grant in relation to his experience in the battlefield, it can no less be applied in situations outside the military sphere, specifically in the broader management decision making. Though the marketplace is decidedly less “bloody” than the battlefield, it however has its tense and “heart – pounding” moments. And it is here that Grant’s thoughts could be useful in gauging risk taking and bidding time. There was this term I learned from Mintzberg and that is “paralysis by analysis”, which is in essence similar to what General Grant was saying all along albeit in a more general context. Paralysis by analysis refers to the indecision of a leader in situations where the analyses are inconclusive. No conclusion, no decision, no moves, period. It can also refer to the fact that with “over” analysis, we tend to be overwhelmed by the gravity of the situation and balk at making a move. Frozen with fear leading again to no movements. What we ought to learn here is that situations may not be what we thought to be since there are a lot of constantly changing variables in play that our mind cannot conceive, which would drastically alter the outcome and one such variable is the opponent’s or competitor’s trepidations. Aside from that, indecision makes us a sitting duck to the conspiring events and to our competitor’s/opponent’s machinations thereby losing our initiatives to play the events to our advantage. However, to forgo analysis and instead purely rely on “instinct” is also unwise for according to Mintzberg, there is such a thing as “extinction by instinct”. Not everyone possesses a superior instinct and instinct is not grounded on facts but on unconscious gut – feel or for most people, emotion, which would be pretty unreliable during confusing uncertainty, i.e., one may cower when the going gets tough. The best way to make a decision is to analyze up to a certain degree, trust your instinct, take risk, siege the initiative, and improvise. That however, is easier said than done. And it is in this situation that we had to refer to Grant’s quotes.
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